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ABSTRACT 
To our best knowledge, this is the first quantitative study on the 
impact of the supplier‘s national culture on the client‘s choice of 
control modes in IS offshoring projects. A survey-based field 
study was conducted, using a client-supplier matched pair as the 
unit of analysis. This approach allowed for the examination of the 
direct control relationship within 46 unique matched pairs. The 
study results offer empirical evidence that the supplier‘s national 
culture (i.e., power distance and time perception) affects the 
client‘s choice of controls in IS offshoring projects. However, the 
supplier‘s cultural background seems to play a less important role 
than suggested by prior research. These results (1) adapt previous 
research to the IS offshoring context, (2) enhance prior findings 
by establishing a more detailed understanding about the cultural 
influence on the exercise of controls as well as by confirming the 
significance of project size–an influencing factor that has 
previously shown mixed results, and (3) incorporate new 
constructs and measures in developing an integrated model that 
should be broadly applicable to other IS project contexts. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
IS offshoring (ISO), defined as the relocation of IS services to a 
captive or third party organization in a foreign, mostly low-wage 
country [42] continues to be an important global trend [25]. ISO 
promises many benefits, such as cost reduction, access to highly 
skilled professionals, and time-to-market reduction (e.g., [42]). 
Despite the manifold benefits, companies‘ ISO experiences have 
not been consistently positive and often ISO projects fail [1]. 
These project failures can often be traced back to national cultural 
differences between client and supplier [38; 44]. This is not 
surprising as ISO projects involve actors from different countries 
and cultures, working together in complex, intensive, and 
dynamic activities that require close cooperation and coordination 
[27]. In particular, many risks associated with ISO projects, such 
as blocked knowledge transfer, differences in the interpretation of 
processes, barriers between individuals, and lack of acceptance of 
foreign behaviors, they all may result from cultural distance [10]. 
One powerful approach for managing client-supplier relationships 
in ISO projects is exercising control [27; 28], which refers to any 
attempt to motivate individuals to behave in a manner consistent 
with organizational objectives [21]. Because ISO ―entails complex 
issues of geographical, cultural, and lingual differences‖, Rustagi 
et al. ([45], p. 139) stress the need for research on control in ISO. 
Here, especially the client‘s control over the supplier is an 
important instrument to ensure project success [9]. However, the 
use of control is complicated by cultural differences which impact 
the coordination of the supplier employees as well as the 
cooperation with them [59]. In a recent study it was found that 
espoused cultural values, such as norms, values, and beliefs, affect 
control choices [28]. In another study, Beck et al. [3] found that 
formal project management and control mechanisms are mainly 
driven by the cultural intelligence of the client‘s ISO project 
manager. High cultural intelligence might lead to a better 
understanding of the controllee‘s cultural values and thus enables 
her/him to better select and execute suitable modes of control [3]. 
It is thus important to examine how the supplier‘s national culture 
affects the client‘s exercise of controls in ISO projects. 
Previous literature has already acknowledged the important role of 
national culture in ISO in general (e.g., [38]). However, two gaps 
are still obvious: First, IS outsourcing and ISO research is still 
primarily based on anecdotal evidence using qualitative 
(interpretive) case studies as main research method [57]. Thus, 
there is still a need to validate and complement these important 
findings by quantitative analyses. Second, so far there has been no 
empirical study which has examined the influence of national 
culture on the choice of control modes. Although Narayanaswamy 
and Henry [37] proposed an initial set of propositions regarding 
the relationship between three of Hofstede‘s cultural dimensions 
and control modes used in offshore-outsourced IS development 
projects, they did not empirically test these propositions. This 
study seeks to fill these gaps by examining how the client‘s 
selection of controls relates to the supplier‘s national culture. We 
address this question by developing a research model which 
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integrates control theory with prior literature on ISO and national 
culture. To test our model, we perform a survey-based field study 
using a client-supplier matched pair as the unit of analysis. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Culture Theory 
In this study, we adopt the value-based definition proposed by 
Hofstede [18]. He defines culture as ―the collective programming 
of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or 
category of people from another‖ (p. 11). This definition describes 
culture as a set of value patterns that are shared by individuals and 
influence how they behave (e.g., [18; 55]). Values refer to 
relationships among abstract categories that are characterized by 
strong affective components and imply a preference for a certain 
type of action [22]. They provide individuals with fundamental 
assumptions about how things are. Based on these assumptions, 
researchers attempt to generalize the patterns of different cultures 
into several dimensions. The defined cultural dimensions provide 
a framework to measure and compare the cultural differences 
from one country (or group) to another [43]. 
ISO is situated within a complex and multi-leveled socio-cultural 
context, which comprises not only the national (societal) level but 
also organizational, professional (functional), team, or individual 
levels [22]. Thus, national culture may not be the only type of 
culture which influences the choice of control. However, cultural 
differences on the national level are presumed to constitute a 
predominant factor influencing ISO project control [33]. Wilkins 
and Ouchi [58] argue, for instance, that ―the learning of 
organizational ‗culture‘ [is] neither as deep nor as immutable as 
the anthropological metaphor would suggest‖ (p. 479). We believe 
that this rationale also applies to the professional and team level 
of culture. 
Even though culture is seen a collective phenomenon and, thus, 
irreducible to the individual level of analysis it can only manifest 
itself through the individual [50]. We therefore argue ―that 
individuals espouse national cultural values to different degrees‖, 
treating these values as an individual difference variable ([48], p. 
680). This perspective allows us to analyze cultural differences on 
different levels without presuming an aggregated type of culture 
on the national level. By disaggregating the monolithic national 
culture construct into its espoused value dimensions it is possible 
to use it as individual difference construct in individual-level 
research such as control theory. As a result, it is possible to 
capture the nuances and distinct effects of the relationship 
between each cultural value and control, which otherwise treated 
as monolithic construct could have been shown as culturally 
invariant [48]. 
2.2 Control Theory 
Our study adopts a behavioral view of control. This view implies 
that the controller takes some action in order to regulate or adjust 
the behavior of the controllee [26], and draws upon organization 
and agency theories consistent with prior studies in IS (e.g., [9; 
26; 27; 28; 29]), organization design (e.g., [13]), and marketing 
(e.g., [21]). 
A control situation typically involves an individual exercising 
control (the controller) and a target of control (the controllee) 
[28]. However, this distinction sometimes becomes fuzzy [9], in 
particular in an ISO context. For instance, the controller and the 
controllee may not be individuals but teams of individuals 
representing their organizational unit or organization respectively. 
Furthermore, in an ISO project the supplier project manager may 
be controlled by the client and, in turn, may control the supplier 
project team members. However, for the specific focus of this 
study, the distinction between controller (in terms of an individual 
in the client organization) and controllee (in terms of an individual 
in the supplier organization) remains largely valid. 
The behavioral view of control presumes that the controller uses 
certain mechanisms to exercise four modes of control, which may 
broadly be divided into formal and informal controls [27]. 
There are two modes of formal control: behavior and outcome 
control [13]. In behavior control, the controller seeks to influence 
the process to achieve the desired outputs by explicitly prescribing 
specific rules and procedures, monitoring their implementation, 
and rewarding the controllee based on the extent to which the 
implementation complies with these rules and procedures [26]. 
This is achieved through the use of mechanisms that either specify 
appropriate behaviors, or allow for the evaluation of the 
controllee‘s behavior [27]. In outcome control, only the outputs 
(both interim and final) are measured and evaluated. Here, the 
controller explicitly defines specific goals and rewards the 
controllee for meeting these goals [13; 27]. Outcome control is 
exercised through mechanisms that specify or measure desired 
outcomes [9].  
Informal control modes are clan and self-control. Clan control 
refers to mechanisms that minimize the differences between the 
controller and controllee‘s objectives [13] by ―promulgating 
common values, beliefs, and philosophy within a clan, which is 
defined as a group of individuals who are dependent on one 
another and who share a set of common goals‖ ([27], p. 217). 
According to this definition, it is questionable whether the clan 
control construct can be applied to ISO projects as the client-
supplier relationship is assumed to be adversarial [32]. Thus, we 
adopt a different interpretation of clan control ―refer[ring] to a 
situation in which the traditional relationship is replaced by a 
scenario where the two organizations perceive themselves as 
having a common, shared goal‖ ([9], p. 293). Unlike clan control, 
self-control is a function of intrinsic motivation [36] as well as 
individual standards and objectives [21]. Even though controllees 
control themselves by their own actions (e.g., setting their own 
goals) [26], the controller can use control mechanisms to assist 
and promote the exercise of self-control by the controllee. 
Controllers often use the four control modes in combination, 
creating a portfolio of controls [21; 27]. Within a portfolio, each 
control mode can itself be implemented through multiple control 
mechanisms [27]. The choice of controls is influenced by different 
factors in the project, stakeholder, and global contexts [27; 28]. 
Factors related to the global context include priority differences 
among stakeholders from different countries, as well as 
geographic, time zone, and cultural differences. In this context, it 
is the cultural factors influencing the choice of controls that are 
still not well understood. These relationships are discussed in 
more detail in the following section. 
3. RESEARCH MODEL AND 
HYPOTHESES 
Our research model considers the relationship between the 
controller‘s choice of controls and the controllee‘s national 
culture. The model draws on five cultural dimensions which can 
be used to define national culture. Here, however, we do not focus 
on the cultural characteristics of specific nations. Instead, we 
attempt to understand how the characteristics of the underlying 
852
espoused cultural values interact with ISO project control [14; 
48]. Figure 1 shows the different constructs and hypotheses. 
According to Carmel [6], cultural dimensions are useful in 
modeling culture-related issues in globally distributed projects. 
From the variety of dimensional models existing at the national 
level, the following five dimensions were selected: power 
distance, individualism/collectivism, uncertainty avoidance [18], 
activity/passivity [35; 52], and mono-/polychronic time perception 
[16]. The selected dimensions were evaluated in terms of their 
suitability to explain cultural characteristics that may affect the 
choice of different control modes in ISO projects. For example 
Hofstede‘s masculinity/femininity dimension was dropped as it 
seems to be highly correlated to age [14]. Some of these 
dimensions have already been applied to ISO-related research, 
including power distance [59], individualism/collectivism [59], 
uncertainty avoidance [49], and activity/passivity [59]. In 
addition, the model was enhanced by the dimension mono-/ 
polychronicity because different views about timelines, deadlines, 
work rhythms, and/or punctuality may impose challenges to the 
coordination (and control) of globally distributed projects [46]. 
3.1 Power Distance  
Power distance is defined as the extent to which the less powerful 
members of institutions and organizations within a society expect 
and accept that power is distributed unequally. In high power 
distance cultures superiors make decisions without consultation 
with subordinates. Employees are fearful of disagreeing with their 
superiors and expect to be told what to do. For example, it was 
found that in rather high power distance cultures like India, 
offshore team members have difficulty in saying no [38; 59]. In 
contrast, in cultures that are low in power distance, relationships 
between superiors and subordinates are more participative and 
egalitarian and subordinates are likely to contradict their superiors 
directly and do not expect to be told what to do [17]. They also 
participate more in decision making activities and prefer a 
consultative relationship with their superiors [17]. 
In particular, in high power distance cultures the controllee feels 
less comfortable in debating and contradicting. They tend to pay 
more attention to the opinions of others and thus tend to be more 
attuned to social norms [48], typically facilitated by clan control. 
Here, clan control mechanisms, such as rituals, ceremonies and 
socialization might mitigate the difference in objectives between 
controller and controllee [9], triggering compliance, identification 
and internalization effects [23], although this might be difficult to 
achieve unless they are part of a long-term alliance [9]. 
H1: The higher the controllee’s power distance the greater the 
exercise of clan control. 
On the other hand, as individuals feel self-motivated and more 
productive when there is less intervention by the managers, self-
control is also likely to be used. This calls for less formal control 
substituted by self-control, defined as controllee-driven 
noncontrolling [51]. This is reinforced by the issue that in 
offshore projects, control of behavior is more difficult and is often 
facilitated and supplemented indirectly by means of self-control 
[51]. In this situation the controller encourages the controllee to 
use self-control or even exerts informal social pressure to use clan 
control [26; 9]. The controllee, then in his role as controller is 
encouraged to use the more difficult formal controls, such as 
outcome or behavioral control on his (supplier) team [9]. 
H2: The lower the controllee’s power distance the greater the 
exercise of self-control. 
3.2 Individualism/Collectivism 
Individualism is defined as the extent to which people prefer to 
act as individuals rather than as members of groups [18]. In 
individualistic cultures the ties between individuals are loose. 
They value personal time and personal accomplishments. In 
contrast, in collectivistic cultures group goals and interests are 
more important than individual desires, and people are integrated 
into strong, cohesive groups. 
In a study on collectivistic and individualistic work groups, Earley 
[12] found that collectivistic individuals show higher performance 
when working in an in-group (i.e., a group they identify with), as 
compared to collectivistic individuals who work by themselves or 
as part of an out-group (i.e., a group they do not identify with). In 
collectivistic societies the focus seems to be more on how well 
subordinates follow prescribed processes instead of assessing 
merely the outcomes [54]. In particular, social norms, duties, and 
obligations guide team members‘ behavior, and group (clan) goals 
seem to have priority [54]. Another aspect is that collectivistic 
employees view their relationship with the employer in moral 
terms. They tend to have a strong sense of identity with and 
loyalty to their organization. Consequently, they will strive to 
achieve outcomes that are in the organization‘s best interest and 
will do so with little expectation of personal gain. The controllee 
team will assume joint responsibility and/or receive joint 
recognition for actions taken or decisions made [55]. They also 
 
Figure 1. Research model 
Client (Controller) Choice of Controls
Supplier (Controllee) Culture
Power Distance Collectivism
Uncertainty 
Avoidance
Activity Monochronicity
Clan Control Self-Control Behavior Control Outcome Control
H1 (+) H2 (-) H3 (+) H4 (-) H5 (-) H6 (+) H7 (-) H8 (+) H9 (-) H10 (+)
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see self-development occurring through harmony and reciprocity 
in interpersonal relations and contributing to the welfare of other 
group members [56]. Hence, implementing control through a 
process of socialization and promoting interpersonal dynamics to 
create shared beliefs will harmonize the values and beliefs among 
the team members [37]. Often, collectivistic cultures prefer 
training and other learning opportunities [54], all indications that 
clan control would be an appropriate choice of control [39]. 
H3: The higher the controllee’s collectivism the greater the 
exercise of clan control. 
On the other side, it is expected that in highly collectivistic 
cultures individuals will keep individuals and organization's 
interests and goals in line because they expect personal reward 
and recognition for their decisions [55]. Thus, providing 
individuals with autonomy will help them to monitor their own 
progress towards achieving common goals. This would favor the 
use of self-control, defined as a function of individual objectives 
and standards and intrinsic motivation [26; 9]. As motivated in 
―Power Distance‖, the encouragement of self-control might 
indirectly help to implement more difficult formal control modes, 
such as behavior control on the supplier side. 
H4: The lower the controllee’s collectivism the greater the 
exercise of self-control. 
3.3 Uncertainty Avoidance 
This dimension describes the extent to which the members of a 
culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations. 
Individuals with low uncertainty avoidance believe that problems 
can be solved without formal rules [37]. They do not seem to be 
dependent on experts and prefer a less structured and rule-oriented 
environment [17]. They prefer rules only in situations of absolute 
necessity. Thus, providing a high degree of autonomy by means of 
self-control will increase project performance [37]. 
H5: The lower the controllee’s uncertainty avoidance the greater 
the exercise of self-control. 
On the other hand, a culture high in uncertainty avoidance would 
exhibit rule orientation, prefer employment stability, and exhibit 
stress when trying to explain, mitigate and minimize the 
uncertainty that is inherent to life [48]. Often, controllees with 
high uncertainty avoidance are dependent on experts and superiors 
for answers and feel secure with defined behaviors [37], thus 
feeling more comfortable with tight behavior controls. In addition, 
high uncertainty avoidance is associated with close 
communication, posing questions, feedback and reassurance, 
increasing the controller‘s understanding of appropriate behaviors 
as controllees might be more willing to reveal their actual work 
behaviors. The understanding of behavior is in turn crucial for 
introducing behavioral controls [37] as it is associated with higher 
behavior measurability. It has been found that, in particular high 
behavior observability facilitates behavior control [26; 27]. This 
finding was recently refined by Kirsch et al. [29] who concluded 
that high behavior observability is associated with the use of 
either behavior control (if the controller is knowledgeable) or clan 
control (if the controller has low knowledge). In particular, as the 
controller‘s technical knowledge is likely to be higher in 
outsourced/offshored projects there is a tendency for the controller 
to use more behavior control [51]. 
H6: The higher the controllee’s uncertainty avoidance the greater 
the exercise of behavior control. 
3.4 Activity/Passivity 
The activity-passivity dimension is defined as the ―extent to 
which individuals in a culture see themselves as doers (active 
shapers of the world) or beers (passive reactors to the world)‖ 
([35], p. 178). In passive cultures people change themselves to fit 
into the environment. They are more cooperative, emphasize the 
experience of living, and are especially concerned with getting 
along with others [53]. In a recent study it was found that offshore 
teams from low activity cultures, such as India, prefer to have 
precisely described software specification and were described as 
―rather passive reactors to pre-specified tasks and methodologies‖ 
([59], p. 249). Moreover, the Indian developers didn‘t appreciate 
open team meetings in which they were urged to actively 
participate in discussions related to wider project-relevant topics 
[59]. This would rather exclude clan and self-control as viable 
control options and instead suggest more directive forms of 
management, i.e., guiding the controllee through the process [52]. 
H7: The lower the controllee’s activity the greater the exercise of 
behavior control. 
In contrast, in active cultures individuals try to change the 
environment to fit them; active cultures are more competitive, 
action-oriented, and emphasize self-fulfillment. Furthermore, in 
more active cultures autonomy to complete requested tasks is 
emphasized as well as fitting to goal-oriented work environments, 
suggesting the use of outcome control and more liberal methods 
of management to be effective [52].  
H8: The higher the controllee’s activity the greater the exercise of 
outcome control. 
3.5 Mono-/Polychronicity 
Individuals with polychronic time perception are involved in 
many different activities with different people at the same time 
[24]. They view time commitment only as an objective to achieve 
when possible and make changes to plans when needed [16]. They 
feel that getting to know their counterparts and building a 
relationship is more important than adhering to a preset schedule. 
Here, monitoring the process may be required to assure 
compliance with project schedules [9]. 
H9: The less monochronic the controllee’s time perception the 
greater the exercise of behavior control. 
In contrast, individuals with monochronic time perception do only 
one thing at a time, take time and deadlines seriously, and adhere 
to preset schedules. For them, time is structured, linear, and 
sequential [16]. They set agendas for meetings and adhere to 
preset schedules. They schedule negotiations in ways that create 
psychological pressure in having to arrive at a decision by a 
certain date [16]. 
H10: The more monochronic the controllee’s time perception the 
greater the exercise of outcome control. 
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
To test the hypothesized relationships in our research model, we 
developed matched-pair survey instruments. Most prior research 
in IS outsourcing/offshoring has collected data from either clients 
or vendors [45]. However, Koh et al. [31] found that stakeholder 
perspectives differ in such arrangements. Consequently, we 
collected data from both clients and suppliers. Clients were 
surveyed on their use of different control modes within the 
examined project and general project characteristics. Suppliers 
responded to items about their national culture. In addition, clients 
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and suppliers provided information about their position and 
professional experience. The use of two questionnaires 
significantly reduces the risks of common source bias [30]. 
4.1 Data Collection 
To ensure the quality of the survey data, projects and respondents 
had to satisfy three criteria for inclusion in the sample. First, ISO 
projects either had to be completed for not more than twelve 
months, or had to be underway for at least three months and 
already reached one milestone. This ensured that included projects 
had progressed to a reasonable maturity [45] and that significant 
activities had recently occurred [30], increasing the reliability of 
the participants‘ perceptions and answers. Second, projects had to 
allow access to both a client representative and her/his supplier 
counterpart. For each selected project, completed survey 
instruments from one matching pair were required. Third, the 
client and supplier members of a dyad must have had operated in 
their roles for at least two months. Establishing this criterion 
ensured that the dyads have had adequate time to work with each 
other and to develop a relationship [45]. Furthermore, all survey 
participants held key positions in their respective organizations 
being responsible for managing the client-supplier relationship–a 
major influence on ISO success [59]. 
A website (http://survey.international-outsourcing.de) was 
launched to host the survey instruments, accelerate 
communications to respondents, and improve accuracy and 
efficiency in data collection and analysis. Next to the online 
questionnaire, we also prepared a paper version of our 
questionnaire to eliminate coverage error [47]. 
We used a convenience sample to collect the survey data. To 
identify appropriate ISO projects and respondents, we contacted 
management executives of client and offshore supplier firms by e-
mail followed by a personal phone call. The executives were 
professional acquaintances of one of the authors. This was a key 
criterion for selecting these sites because it enhanced our ability to 
ensure the appropriateness of the ultimate respondents [45]. If an 
executive agreed to participate, she/he was asked to nominate 
suitable projects and respondents and solicit the participation of 
the executive of the counterpart organization. The use of this 
―known sponsor approach‖ [40] often resulted in immediate 
legitimacy and credibility of the research team and study. The 
client and/or vendor executive then forwarded a personalized e-
mail with the study invitation to each potential respondent within 
the nominated project(s). This e-mail contained the URL address 
and a link to the website where the survey was available, the name 
of the questionnaire to be filled in, and the unique matched pair 
ID which was used to join the data records of the paired client and 
supplier representatives during data analysis. The e-mail also 
guaranteed the anonymity and confidentiality of the respondents, 
and clearly specified the goals of the study, the potential benefits 
to the participants, and the required level of participation. As an a 
priori strategy to minimize non-response error and its impact on 
the validity of inferences, we used Dillman‘s [11] Tailored Design 
Method. 
Of the 18 executives who were initially requested to participate in 
the study, 14 agreed, for a response rate of 78 percent. Follow-up 
communications with the four non-participating executives did 
not reveal any trends or reasons that would point toward a non-
response bias. A total of 96 client and supplier project team 
members were asked to participate in our study. In all, 94 
respondents (46 client and 48 supplier representatives) filled in 
the questionnaire, resulting in a response rate of 98 percent. In 
order to form one data record for each matched pair, the matching 
client and supplier data records were joined based on the included 
ID. Two non-paired data records were dropped from the analysis, 
resulting in a sample size of 46 unique matched pairs. A 
comparison of the data of early returned questionnaires with that 
of later returned ones showed no indication of non-response error. 
Furthermore, the wide range of responses to our survey items 
indicates a lower risk of non-response bias [45]. 
4.2 Instrument Development 
Two survey instruments were developed for this study, one for 
collecting data about the dependent variables (choice of controls) 
from the clients, and one for collecting data about the independent 
variables (national culture) from the suppliers. Generally accepted 
guidelines were followed in developing these instruments. All 
latent variables were measured with multiple items. Scale items 
were derived from prior research: To measure the four modes of 
control, we adopted Kirsch et al.‘s [29] items for behavior, 
outcome and clan control, and adapted Brief and Aldag [5], 
Choudhury and Sabherwal [9], and Kirsch et al.‘s [29] items for 
self-control. Measures for the cultural dimensions power distance, 
individualism/collectivism, and uncertainty avoidance were 
adopted from Hofstede‘s ―Values Survey Module‖ [19]. However, 
scale items for the constructs activity and monochronicity were 
newly developed since we were not able to identify suitable 
measuring instruments. Although some scholars have 
conceptualized the cultural dimensions associated with these 
constructs, relatively few have attempted to measure them 
directly. The new items used in this study reflect and measure key 
concepts of activity and monochronicity, and are grounded in the 
work of Lytle et al. [35] and Triandis [52], and Hall and Hall [16], 
respectively. The three activity items assessed the controllee‘s 
individual initiative to complete tasks and find solutions to 
recurring issues, and her/his willingness to accept challenging 
tasks. The two monochronicity items involved the adherence to 
preset plans and time targets. All constructs were measured 
reflectively. Except for the demographic items, all items were 
rated on five-point Likert scales. 
Prior research noted the effect of project size [27] and controllee‘s 
domain-specific knowledge [9; 26] on control choices. Hence, we 
included project size and supplier ISO knowledge as control 
variables in our analysis. Project size was measured by requesting 
client managers to indicate the amount of person months needed 
to execute the ISO project. ISO knowledge was estimated by 
asking (supplier) respondents to indicate their number of years of 
experience in the ISO field on a three-point Likert scale. The 
project volume and the ISO experience were used as proxies for 
project size and supplier ISO knowledge, respectively. 
In March 2010, we conducted a pretest with five IS practitioners 
and four academics with expertise in ISO and survey methods. 
Furthermore, two experienced IS faculty members reviewed the 
client and supplier questionnaire and provided comments for 
improvement. Following the pretest, we selected a large-scale ISO 
arrangement as the site for the pilot study. This arrangement 
involved a multinational client organization with annual revenues 
of more than ten billion US dollars that has offshored IS services 
to an Indian vendor. A total of eleven respondents participated in 
the pilot study, eight client and three supplier representatives. The 
pilot resulted in clarification of the unit of analysis: The client-
supplier pair rather than the ISO project. In addition, a power 
distance measure was added, the wording of some measures was 
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slightly changed, and the degree of data anonymity and 
confidentiality was further emphasized. Respondents in the pilot 
study were not in the main sample. 
5. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Before testing the research model, we provide descriptive 
statistics for our sample. Over a five-month period, we collected 
data from a total of 36 projects from 16 client organizations. All 
of these organizations operate from German-speaking countries 
(12, 3, and 1 from Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, 
respectively). 14 of them are large for-profit firms and two small 
or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
26 projects dealt with ―applications development/testing‖; five 
projects were characterized as ―applications management‖, and 
two as ―IT infrastructure management (managed services)‖. The 
project volume ranged from very small (less than 24 person 
months) to very large (600 or more person months), with a slight 
preponderance of larger projects. 33 projects involved large-scale 
supplier organizations, while three projects involved SME 
suppliers. 20 projects were executed with independent supplier 
firms (third party vendors and global IT service providers), 15 
with a subsidiary of the client firm, and one with a joint venture. 
One project involved a nearshore supplier (Slovakia). In contrast, 
more than 90 percent of the projects were offshored to India.  
63 percent of the client representatives stated that they had more 
than five years of experience in the IS field, while 96 percent 
declared having more than one year of experience in the ISO field. 
Almost 70 percent of the supplier representatives indicated having 
more than five years of experience in both the IS and ISO field. 
To test the research model, we transformed it into a structural 
equation model, using the software SmartPLS. Partial least 
squares (PLS) has the ability to handle relatively small sample 
sizes [30], making it an appropriate choice. Basically, our data 
analysis followed a two-stage process as suggested by Chin [7] 
and Hulland [20]: First, we assessed the reliability and validity of 
the measurement model. Second, we tested the structural model 
and its hypotheses, and analyzed the effect of control variables. 
5.1 Assessment of the Measurement Model 
Five criteria need to be examined to determine the adequacy of 
the measurement model. These criteria are discussed below. 
(1) Content validity: Content validity indicates to what extent the 
variables of a measurement model belong to the domain of the 
construct [4]. This was assured by selecting well established 
measures from prior research (wherever feasible), consulting 
experts in a pretest, and conducting a pilot study. 
(2) Item reliability: Item reliability specifies which part of an 
item‘s variance can be explained by the underlying construct. If 
item loadings within the PLS model are lower than 0.40 they 
should be eliminated [20]. Loadings were analyzed using the PLS 
path weighting scheme. A number of items were below the 0.40 
threshold. On the part of the independent variables, similar to 
Srite and Karahanna [48] we encountered difficulties in some of 
the original culture items adopted from Hofstede‘s ―Values 
Survey Module‖ [19]. The analysis indicated problems with three 
power distance items, two collectivism items, two uncertainty 
avoidance items, and one activity item. On the part of the 
dependent variables, the generated item loadings showed 
problems with three outcome control items, one clan control item, 
and one self-control item. These items were removed from the 
model. PLS analysis was then run again reporting high loadings 
for all culture-related and control-related items (above 0.60 and 
0.71, respectively), except for one behavior control item (0.53). A 
generally accepted rule of thumb is that item loadings should be 
greater than 0.70 [2]. However, in exploratory work loadings of 
0.50 are still acceptable [8]. Thus, all items can be considered 
significant. 
(3) Construct reliability: Construct reliability (or internal 
consistency) indicates how well a construct is measured by its 
items. It can be assessed with the composite reliability measure 
[15]. As seen in the ―Fornell‖ column in Table 1, all constructs 
exceed the recommended cut-off of 0.6 [15], and are thus reliable. 
(4) Convergent validity: Table 1 displays the correlations analysis 
of the independent variables, the dependent variables, and the two 
control variables. The boldface diagonal cells are the square root 
of the average variance extracted (AVE), which is a measure of 
the variance shared between a construct and its items. Each 
variable has an AVE of at least 0.5, establishing convergent 
validity for all scales [15]. 
(5) Discriminant validity: A necessary condition for discriminant 
validity is that a latent variable shares more variance with its 
assigned items than with any other latent variable [15]. The off-
diagonal cells in Table 1 show the correlations between the 
Table 1. Correlations between constructs 
Construct Fornell PD CO UA AC MO BC OC CC SC PS IK 
Power Distance (PD) 0.77 0.80 
          
Collectivism (CO) 0.76 -0.18 0.79 
         
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) 0.75 0.40 -0.05 0.78 
        
Activity (AC) 0.78 -0.04 -0.23 0.05 0.81 
       
Monochronicity (MO) 0.67 0.23 -0.04 0.38 0.30 0.71 
      
Behavior Control (BC) 0.65 0.26 -0.06 0.06 0.16 0.41 0.71 
     
Outcome Control (OC) 0.83 -0.29 -0.29 -0.13 0.37 0.14 0.13 0.84 
    
Clan Control (CC) 0.80 0.39 0.12 -0.01 0.13 -0.02 0.38 -0.05 0.76 
   
Self-Control (SC) 0.83 -0.29 -0.16 -0.24 0.14 0.00 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.79 
  
Project Size (PS) 1.00 -0.09 -0.01 -0.05 0.02 -0.33 -0.42 -0.07 0.02 0.03 1.00 
 
ISO Knowledge (IK) 1.00 -0.11 -0.10 -0.13 0.09 -0.08 -0.13 0.06 -0.38 -0.14 0.10 1.00 
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constructs. The diagonal values are significantly greater than the 
off-diagonal values in the corresponding rows and columns, 
indicating discriminant validity for all scales [20]. Additionally, 
each within-construct item loads highly on the construct it is 
supposed to measure, and cross-loadings are lower than the 
within-construct item loadings. 
5.2 Assessment of the Structural Model 
The assessment of the inner model involves estimating the path 
coefficients and the R²-values. Path coefficients specify the 
strengths of the relationships between the independent and 
dependent variables, while the R²-value is a measure of the 
predictive power of a model for the dependent variables [30]. A 
bootstrap resampling method (1.000 re-samples) was used to 
determine the significance of the paths within the structural 
model. The sample size of 46 matched pairs exceeded the 
recommended minimum of 30 data records, which is ten times the 
largest number of independent variables influencing dependent 
variables in the structural model [2]. 
H1 and H2 pertain to power distance. As expected, power distance 
is significantly related with the exercise of clan control (b = 0.387; 
t = 2.426; p < 0.05) and self-control (b = -0.287; t = 1.743; p < 
0.10). Both paths have effects in the predicted directions, 
supporting H1 and H2. Collectivism does not significantly affect 
the choice of informal controls (clan and self-control). Thus, H3 
and H4 are not supported. H5 suggests a negative relationship 
between uncertainty avoidance and the use of self-control. H6 
proposes a positive effect of uncertainty avoidance on the exercise 
of behavior control. However, both hypotheses are not significant. 
H7, which hypothesizes a negative relationship between activity 
and behavior control, as well as H8, which assumes a positive 
effect between activity and outcome control, are not significant, 
either. The latter path almost reached the critical t-value of 1.66 
(b= 0.368, t = 1.484), and might therefore be worthwhile for 
further investigation in future research. Contrary to expectations, 
monochronicity has a significant and positive relationship with 
behavior control (b = 0.310; t = 1.751; p < 0.10). This finding is in 
the opposite direction of the relationship hypothesized (H9) and 
suggests that if the controllee‘s monochronic time perception is 
high, the controller‘s exercise of behavior control is also high, and 
vice versa. Finally, monochronicity is not significantly associated 
with the use of outcome control. Thus, H10 is not supported. 
Table 2 gives a detailed overview of the hypotheses test results. 
Approximately 30 percent (R² = 0.298) of the variance in clan 
control, 19 percent (R² = 0.192) of the variance in self-control, 28 
percent (R² = 0.278) of the variance in behavior control, and 15 
percent (R² = 0.145) of the variance in outcome control are 
explained by the model. Ranging from 0.287 to 0.387, all path 
coefficients of the supported hypotheses clearly exceeded the 
suggested minimum value of significance at 0.20 [7]. Therefore, 
the fit of the overall model is deemed to be good [30]. 
The controllees‘ ISO knowledge and project size were included in 
the model as control variables. For both variables, one 
relationship with a dependent construct was found to be 
significant: ISO knowledge lowers the exercise of clan control (b 
= -0.333; t = 2.463; p < 0.05); project size is negatively associated 
with the use of behavior control (b = -0.310; t = 1.756; p < 0.10). 
6. DISCUSSION 
Before discussing the study results and their implications, some of 
the key limitations have to be mentioned. First, only a moderate 
sample size of 46 matched pairs was achieved. This sample size 
could potentially limit the power of the statistical techniques. 
Second, the findings of this study may be specific to ISO 
arrangements between Germany and India as the majority of the 
participating controllees were Indian, while most controllers were 
German. Third, the extent or amount to which the four control 
modes were exercised was not examined. Forth, this study only 
provides insight into the client‘s choice of controls. Hence, it does 
not examine the mechanisms used internally by the supplier. 
Finally, there are also limitations specific to measuring cultural 
values on the individual level that apply to all culture studies. As 
such, there is a concern that some of these cultural values are 
subtle and implicit and as such cannot easily be reported [48]. 
Before discussing the cultural value dimensions showing positive 
effects on control modes, we provide a brief discussion of the non 
significant relationships. 
Collectivism, uncertainty avoidance and activity don‘t show 
significant relationships to any of the four control modes. Please 
note that the path from activity to outcome control is just below 
the significance threshold of 1.66. Obviously, ISO project 
managers don‘t pay particular attention to these three dimensions 
Table 2. Hypotheses test results 
  
Hypothesis 
Standardized Path 
Coefficient (b) 
t-Value 
for Path 
p-Value  
(two-tailed) 
 H1 Power Distance  Clan Control (+) 0.387 2.426 0.05 
 H2 Power Distance  Self-Control (-) -0.287 1.743 0.10 
X H3 Collectivism  Clan Control (+) 0.162 1.036 
 
X H4 Collectivism  Self-Control (-) -0.239 1.014 
 
X H5 Uncertainty Avoidance  Self-Control (-) -0.169 0.947 
 
X H6 Uncertainty Avoidance  Behavior Control (+) -0.086 0.524 
 
X H7 Activity  Behavior Control (-) 0.088 0.365 
 
X H8 Activity  Outcome Control (+) 0.368 1.484 
 
 H9 Monochronicity  Behavior Control (-) 0.310 1.751 0.10 
X H10 Monochronicity  Outcome Control (+) 0.004 0.025 
 
"" indicates significant relationship; "x" indicates not significant relationship 
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when selecting their portfolio of control. Several explanations 
might account for this finding. First, it is possible that controllers 
do not care about the cultural values associated with these 
dimensions. Second, it might be particularly difficult to identify 
and observe these three cultural dimensions at the supplier‘s side. 
It might well be that these values are hidden as they are more tacit 
and deeply engrained [48]. Hence, the controller cannot take into 
account these cultural values when selecting appropriate controls. 
Finally, there could also be mediation effects between these 
cultural values and control choices responsible for these non-
significant results. For example, behavior measurability could be 
mediating the relationship between uncertainty avoidance and 
control. Here, individuals with high uncertainty cultural values are 
more willing to reveal their actual behavior, a prerequisite for 
high behavior measurability, which in turn is associated with the 
use of either behavior control (if the controller is knowledgeable) 
or clan control (if the controller has low knowledge) [29]. 
6.1 Power Distance 
Power distance was found to have a significant impact on 
informal control modes. This finding supports our hypotheses 
such that the higher the controllee‘s power distance the greater the 
exercise of clan control and the lower the controllee‘s power 
distance the greater the exercise of self-control. 
Obviously, in high power distance cultures controllers take into 
account the controllees‘ predispositions such as that employees 
are fearful of disagreeing with their superiors and expect to be 
told what to do. They thus select clan control mechanisms, such as 
rituals, ceremonies and socialization to mitigate the difference in 
objectives between them and the controllees [9]. As controllees 
are more attuned by social norms [48] it is likely that they are 
more reachable by clan control. 
On the other hand, our finding also confirms that self-control is a 
feasible option for low power distance cultures and a less 
favorable option for high power distance cultures. Typically, in 
high power distance cultures controllees ask for guidance. As a 
result, controllers are less likely to use control mechanisms that 
require high levels of autonomy and self-management. This 
finding is important because it further supports findings from 
prior literature that already proclaimed the important role of 
power distance in the context of ISO (e.g., [41; 59]). 
In general, our findings emphasize the importance of informal 
controls with regard to the power distance value, may it be as 
complementary to formal control, or as dominant control mode. 
6.2 Monochronicity 
Our results confirmed a significant relationship between 
monochronicity and behavior control but in the opposite direction 
as hypothesized, such that the more monochronic the controllee‘s 
time perception the greater the exercise of behavior control. This 
result is counterintuitive. Several explanations are possible. First, 
the rationale for our hypothesis rested on Choudhury and 
Sabherwal‘s [9] finding that in an outsourcing context, tight 
behavioral controls are preferable in order to meet project 
schedules. This finding is based on anecdotal evidence from five 
cases, and thus might be specific to the particular context in these 
cases. Second, there is also evidence that control that counteract 
behavior may lead to typical resistance behavior, causing so called 
―ripple and knock-on effects‖ [34]. Ripple effects are primary side 
effects of well-intentioned control efforts, whereas knock-on 
effects show ―secondary impacts of project control efforts, i.e., the 
impacts of ripple effects, often caused by processes that produce 
excessive or detrimental concurrence or human factors that 
amplify the negative effects via channels such as morale. Here, 
the use of less tight controls (e.g., outcome controls) might make 
monochronic controllees feel unsecure (ripple effect), decreasing 
their productivity (knock-on effect). Controllers anticipating these 
(negative) side effects might thus try to exercise more behavior 
control for monochronic controllees and, in turn, less behavior 
control for more polychronic controllees. 
6.3 Project Size 
Our results show that project size has a significant negative 
relationship with behavior control, such that the lower the project 
size the greater the exercise of behavior control. There is a 
plausible possible for this. Smaller projects are better controllable 
by means of behavior control as behavior observability is higher 
compared to larger, more complex projects, thus increasing the 
option to use behavior control. This extends the findings of 
Choudhury and Sabherwal [9], who didn‘t find a significant 
impact of project size on the choice of controls in outsourcing 
projects, and it may well be that their anecdotal evidence from 
five cases didn‘t allow generalization to a larger population of 
ISO projects. Our findings also contradict the findings of Jaworski 
[21], who found that larger projects prefer more formal control. 
However Jaworski didn‘t specify the mode of formal control so it 
is not clear whether this also included behavior control. 
6.4 Supplier ISO Knowledge 
The path between supplier ISO knowledge and clan control shows 
a significant negative relationship between these two, such that 
the lower the supplier‘s ISO knowledge the greater the use of clan 
control. This significant effect has not yet been articulated in past 
research. In general, there is agreement that the choice of controls 
further depends on the knowledge of the stakeholders [28]. In 
particular, a knowledgeable controllee makes the controller feel 
more confident in using self- or outcome control [26]. Even 
though we used ISO experience (number of years) as proxy for 
ISO knowledge, our results shed more light into the role of 
supplier experience (and thus knowledge) for using clan control. 
Apparently, for less experienced controllees, controllers tend to 
rely on clan control, although in distant offshore relationships 
implementing clan control can be very costly. Exercising clan 
control by participating in project team meetings requires 
considerable time and commitment. However, it might well be 
that clan control is still the only feasible option or supplements 
well other more formal control mechanisms. On the other hand, if 
controllees are highly experienced, often these costly clan controls 
may not be necessary to this extend. 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Our research aims to contribute to the ISO and control literature in 
several ways. First, our results enhance prior findings by 
establishing a more detailed understanding about the influence of 
the supplier‘s cultural values on the exercise of control. Second, 
we were able to confirm the significance of two control variables, 
such as project size and the supplier‘s ISO knowledge. In 
particular project size has so far shown mixed results [27; 9]. 
Third, we incorporated and successfully applied new measures for 
self-control and developed new items for the constructs activity 
and monochronicity.  
Our results also have important implications for practice. In 
general, our results suggest that informal controls are a powerful 
managerial tool for steering ISO projects. In particular, our view 
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of self-control (i.e., mechanisms the controller uses to assist and 
promote the exercise of self-control by the controllee) has 
interesting implications: Self-control could be used as a means to 
implement more difficult formal controls for less motivated, 
difficult to control and dependent controllees. For instance, 
control of the supplier team members‘ behavior can be indirectly 
achieved by means of self-control through the supplier‘s project 
manager who acts as controller for her/his supplier team [51]. 
Furthermore, our results suggest that when ISO client managers 
select their portfolio of control they should consider the cultural 
values of their supplier counterparts, may they be ―easy to 
observe‖ (power distance) or more ―hidden‖ (collectivism, 
uncertainty avoidance, and activity). Finally, our research sheds 
new light on the importance of cultural trainings [59]. Trainings 
focusing on cultural values could effectively improve cultural 
intelligence, thereby enabling client project managers to better 
determine culture-specific elements of behavior [3], which in turn 
is a prerequisite to select appropriate controls and to fine-tune 
them. 
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